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A Federal Judge Thwarts Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by Ruling
Bizarrely That Lactation Is Not Related to Pregnancy

A prominent contributor to Rick Santorum’s presidential campaign startled audiences last week by suggesting
that Bayer aspirin could be used as a reliable method of contraception. The contributor, Foster Friess, in an
interview (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/16/foster-friess-rick-santorum-contraception_n_1282466.html)
with MSNBC host Andrea Mitchell, insisted that “back in [his] day,” aspirin was a surefire way to prevent
pregnancy.
How exactly would that work? Friess explained, “The gals put it between their knees.” In other words, aspirinclenching knees would prevent conception by preventing sex. An added bonus: this aspirin method of
contraception, claimed Friess, “wasn’t that costly.”
Friess was, of course, joking, although I doubt that many women were laughing. But the recent fight over the
scope of the religious exemption to the provision of the federal health care reform law—which requires
comprehensive insurance plans to provide coverage for prescription contraceptives at no cost to the user—is no
joke. It’s a dead serious, highly contested issue.
The new federal law mandates that insurance plans must cover prescription contraceptives at no cost to the
women who use them. The mandate resulted from a report (http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Clinical-PreventiveServices-for-Women-Closing-the-Gaps.aspx) by the Institute of Medicine finding that access to contraception is
essential to women’s health, and that contraception is insufficiently accessible to many women.
Beginning in August 2012, contraception will be one of several preventive health services that must be included
in health insurance plans, at no cost to the user. The Catholic Church strenuously objects to the mandate, and has
been locked in a bitter battle with the Obama Administration over the scope of the religious exemption. (The
religious-exemption issues were recently explored in detail by my Verdict co-columnist, Vikram Amar, and by
Verdict guest columnist Alan Brownstein, here (http://verdict.justia.com/2012/02/16/the-right-way-to-accommodatereligious-objections-to-the-contraception-coverage-mandate) .)
The exemption, as embodied in a final ruling
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(http://www.regulations.gov/#%21documentDetail;D=HHS_FRDOC_0001-0443) of the Department of Health and

Human Services in December 2011, was narrow—applying only to churches and other houses of worship.
However, the Obama Administration backtracked a bit after a furious backlash ensued. The Administration has
now agreed to a compromise that will guarantee employees of religiously-affiliated organizations (such as certain
hospitals and universities) access to prescription contraceptives at no cost, but will also ensure that the insurance
company, rather than the employer, foots the bill.
Putting the religious issues aside, though, this controversy about the federal mandate for contraceptive coverage
is merely the latest battle in a long-running war—variously involving employers, employees, insurance
companies, state governments, and the federal government—about whether women, alone, should bear all the
consequences, costs and hardships of reproduction.
One focal point of this debate has been the courts, which have been asked repeatedly to decide whether
employers’ failure to provide insurance coverage for prescription contraceptives constitutes either sex
discrimination or pregnancy discrimination.
Now, the very same legal issue is at the core of a recent ruling by a federal judge in EEOC v. Houston Funding,
Inc. (http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/texas/txsdce/4:2011cv02442/899819/21) that lactation
discrimination is not actionable under Title VII or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) because lactation is,
the judge reasoned, not related to pregnancy. In this column, I’ll consider this recent case, as well as earlier cases
on contraceptive equity and infertility discrimination, which raise similar questions about how far the law goes—
and should go—to protect women against reproduction discrimination.
Lactation Discrimination In Employment: A Federal Judge Holds That Such a Claim Is Not Actionable as
Either Pregnancy or Sex Discrimination
The plaintiff in the lactation-discrimination case was Donnicia Venters. Venters was hired by Houston Funding
in 2006. Two years later, on December 1, 2008, she took a leave of absence to give birth. The company had no
maternity leave policy and was too small to be covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which
guarantees up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for a variety of reasons, including childbirth and newborn parenting,
for employees of companies with at least fifty employees.
Venters gave birth on December 11. A few days later, she spoke with the company’s vice president, Henry
Cagle, who asked her when she planned to return to work. She said that she did not know, and that she was
waiting for her doctor to advise her on that subject. During January and early February 2009, Venters
communicated regularly with people at her office, including team leaders, and continued to pay her insurance
premium. She never provided an exact return date, but she repeatedly expressed her desire to return soon.
During a meeting held on February 10, a group of employees, including Cagle, met and together decided to fire
Venters. A few days later, Venters’s doctor advised her that she could return to work. On February 16, Venters
left a message informing Cagle that she had been cleared to work. The next day, February 17, Venters called
again; told Cagle that she was ready to return to work; and asked if she could use a back room to pump breast
milk. Cagle informed her that they had replaced her because they had not heard from her about firm plans to
return to work. Only then did the company send her a letter firing her—purportedly for job abandonment.
Venters received that letter—which was dated February 16, the day before Venters had asked to be able to pump
breast milk in a back room at work—on February 26.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Venters’s employer on her behalf. It claimed
that the company had fired Venters because she wanted to pump breast milk at work. However, the federal
district judge who heard Venters’s case ruled that even if Venters was right that the company had, indeed, fired
her because of her request to pump breast milk, firing her for that reason was not a legally actionable form of
discrimination.
“The law,” the judge wrote, “does not punish lactation discrimination.” Lactation discrimination is not
pregnancy discrimination, according to the judge, because it is not “pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical
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condition” under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
The EEOC also contended, on Venters’s behalf, that to fire Venters had constituted sex discrimination. But the
judge deemed that argument worthy of but a single, conclusory sentence: “Firing someone because of lactation or
breast-pumping is not sex discrimination.”
What Legal Protections Do Women Have When the Reproductive Process Conflicts With Work?
The reproductive process can have many consequences for women. But one type of consequence is the impact
on their working lives. Women can suffer temporary disability, due to pregnancy and childbirth, which makes
them unable to work. They can require time off work or other accommodations because of partial incapacity, or
the need to tend to medical issues. And, they may need the benefit of insurance coverage to cover medical costs
or disability payments to compensate for lost wages due to temporary incapacity that is due to pregnancy or
childbirth.
These work-related conflicts can arise not only during the nine months of pregnancy, or during the period of
childbirth and recovery from it, but also at the outer edges of the reproductive process. Conflicts may arise, for
instance, when women are trying to access contraception in order to prevent pregnancy, or seeking infertility
treatments to achieve it. And conflicts may arise when women are trying to juggle breastfeeding with the
demands of work after a child is born, as Venters sought to do.
Importantly, each of these issues—access to prescription contraceptives, treatment for female infertility,
pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation—is unique to women. Thus, the way an employer deals with any of these
issues can raise the specter not only of pregnancy discrimination, but also of sex discrimination.
In an ideal world, the workplace would be structured to accommodate reproduction, as it is an essential aspect of
human life. But historically, most workplaces were designed with male workers in mind, and the evolution of a
more inclusive and accommodating structure has been slow. Law has played an integral—though,
disappointingly, not yet sufficient—role in protecting women as they try to navigate the many potential conflicts
between reproduction and work.
The centerpiece of protection for women in the reproductive phase of life is the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978 (“PDA”). The PDA amended Title VII, the central federal anti-discrimination statute.
Prior to the enactment of the PDA, the Supreme Court, in General Electric v. Gilbert
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/429/125/case.html) , had interpreted Title VII to exclude pregnancy
discrimination from its protection. The PDA specifically overruled the ruling in that case, and made clear that
Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination included discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.” The PDA, in a second clause, also guarantees that employers must treat pregnant workers at
least as well as they treat comparably-disabled workers, with respect to leave, insurance benefits, and so on.
The cases dealing with contraception, infertility treatment, and lactation all raise the same question: What is the
intended scope of the phrase “related medical condition” in the first clause of the PDA? The U.S. Supreme Court
has spoken to this question only once, in its 1987 decision in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/499/187/case.html) . There, the court considered the validity of a battery
manufacturer’s policy of prohibiting fertile women from working in jobs involving lead exposure. The Court
struck down the policy as a violation of the PDA. To reach that conclusion, the Court reasoned that the PDA
prohibits discrimination on the basis of potential, as well as actual, pregnancy. Thus, screening out applicants
based on whether they could become pregnant while in a job with potentially dangerous lead exposure was
unlawful under the PDA.
Contraceptive Coverage and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Based in large part on the precedent set by Johnson Controls, the EEOC issued a ruling that the PDA also
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees who try to control their own ability to get pregnant,
through the use of contraception. The class of prescription drugs and devices that are currently available to
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prevent pregnancy– birth control pills, Depo Provera, and intrauterine devices (IUDs), to name the most common
options—are exclusively used by women. Female employees are therefore the ones who are hurt by the lack of
insurance coverage for contraception. And if the lack of access to contraception contributes to unwanted
pregnancies, that situation, in turn, visits upon the pregnant employee a host of additional disproportionate and
unique burdens of the type that only women face.
While the EEOC has been a strong supporter of contraceptive equity, court rulings on the topic have been mixed.
In 2001, a federal district court in Washington State reached the same conclusion as the EEOC had in Erickson v.
Bartell Drug Co. This was the first court ruling to hold that employer-based insurance plans must cover
prescription contraceptives as a matter of federal anti-discrimination law. But other federal courts have reached
the opposite conclusion, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Standridge v. Union
Pacific Railroad Company (http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/06-1706/061706p-2011-02-25.html)
. The court in that case concluded that contraception is not a “related medical condition” under the terms of the
PDA, even though the Supreme Court had held in Johnson Controls that the statutory text was broad enough to
encompass “potential pregnancy.”
Although litigation over contraceptive coverage was successful only sometimes, the number of insurance plans
that cover prescription contraceptives has tripled in the last decade. As many as 9 in 10 plans today provide such
coverage, due in large part to the adoption, in many states, of laws mandating this type of coverage. Efforts were
also made at the federal level to pass a contraceptive equity law, but such a law never made it through Congress.
As part of federal health care reform, however, coverage for prescription contraceptives will become, as
discussed at the beginning of this column, nearly universal. The religious exemption and a temporary
grandfather clause will allow some employers to continue excluding contraceptives from the coverage they
provide, but now, most insurance plans will provide cost-free contraceptives to their customers.
Even With Greater Coverage for Contraception as the Result of Federal Health Care Reform, the
Meaning of the PDA Still Matters
The importance of the PDA to contraceptive equity has diminished greatly, given the state and federal
contraceptive benefit mandates. But the meaning of the PDA’s phrase “pregnancy, childbirth, and related
medical conditions” is still highly relevant for women who are discriminated against at work because they seek
treatment for infertility, or seek to breastfeed after returning to work.
Women suing under the PDA for discrimination based on the denial of insurance coverage (through an employerprovided plan) for infertility treatment have generally been unsuccessful. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit rejected such a claim in the 1996 case of Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, holding that
infertility is not a “related medical condition” under the PDA because both men and women can suffer from it.
Infertility is thus unlike the “potential pregnancy” recognized in Johnson Controls, which is unique to women.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Saks v. Franklin Covey Co.,
even though the procedures that were excluded by the insurance plan, such as artificial insemination and in vitro
fertilization (IVF), were only performed on women. In that court’s view, the PDA only covers conditions that
are “unique to women.” Infertility, it reasoned, could affect women, men, or couples in combination.
A woman who was allegedly fired for requesting time to undergo IVF won her case, however. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in 2008, in Hall v. Nalco, that if the plaintiff’s allegations were true, she
“was terminated not for the gender-neutral condition of infertility, but rather for the gender-specific quality of
childbearing capacity.” (I have written about this case in detail here
(http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20080819.html) .) Central to the court’s reasoning was that those who take
“time off to undergo IVF—just like those terminated for taking time off to give birth or receive other pregnancyrelated care—will always be women.”
Lactation Is, of Course, a Condition Related to Pregnancy and Childbirth—and Courts Should So Hold
The lactation case discussed above involving Venters, EEOC v. Houston Funding
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(http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/texas/txsdce/4:2011cv02442/899819/21) , raises the same question, in

essence, as Hall: Can an employee be fired because of her childbearing capacity. Venters alleged not that she
was refused time or space to pump breast milk, but that she was fired for even asking to pump breast milk at
work. The judge in that case rejected her pregnancy discrimination claim, offering the following reasoning:
Discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition is illegal. Related
conditions may include cramping, dizziness, and nausea while pregnant. Even if the company’s
claim that [Venters] was fired for abandonment is meant to hide the real reason—she wanted to
pump breast milk—lactation is not pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition. She gave
birth on December 11, 2009. After that day, she was no longer pregnant and her pregnancy-related
conditions ended.
This reasoning is preposterous from virtually any perspective:
Scientifically, of course, it would be ridiculous to argue that lactation is not a “related medical condition”
regarding pregnancy or childbirth, since the production of milk is an involuntary, physiological response to
giving birth.
Logically, as well, the reasoning can’t be followed, since it would mean that a woman who suffers any number of
childbirth-related complications is not protected by the PDA if those complications happened to occur after,
rather than before, the birth.
Legally, too, the judge’s reasoning is absurd. It violates both the text and spirit of the PDA. The PDA was
enacted to strike at the broad spectrum of employer policies and practices designed to keep women of
reproductive age out of the workplace. It was enacted to stop employers from reacting on impulse and stereotype
about the capabilities and talents of pregnant women and to force them to assess women as individuals. As
written, the PDA prohibits employers from subjecting women to any employment decision because of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions. Firing a new mother because she seeks to breastfeed is exactly the type
of discrimination the PDA was intended to eradicate. If employers could legally fire employees for lactating, that
would be an easy way to rid the workplace of many of its women. Moreover, singling out employees for adverse
treatment, based on a characteristic that afflicts only one members of one sex, is sex discrimination, plain and
simple. Only women give birth, and only women lactate.
Note, in this case, that the plaintiff, Venters, did not request any time off or change in her duties to accommodate
her desire to pump milk. The PDA, particularly as interpreted by federal courts, is quite stingy regarding the
right to insist on workplace accommodations for pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. As I have
written elsewhere (http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20081028.html) , employers need only accommodate
such needs if they offer accommodation for other temporarily disabled employees. Venters’s employer may
well, thus, have been able lawfully to refuse her request.
But Venters, the plaintiff in Houston Funding, was simply asking not to be fired after revealing that she planned
to breastfeed (and pump milk) after returning to work. She deserved the chance to prove that her employer had
fired her for just that reason—and thus to vindicate her right against this form of discrimination. Health care
reform may resolve the important and longstanding problem with contraceptive access in this country, but even
though this important battle has been mostly won, we must not forget about other aspects of the reproductive
process that still leave women especially vulnerable in the workplace.
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